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The process of individual identity formation is still an enigma, as it is the capacity of 
public  bodies  to  intervene  on  it.  In  1983  the  Catalan  education  system  became 
bilingual, and Catalan, together with Spanish, was taught in schools. Using survey data 
from  Catalonia  and  exploiting  within  and  between  cohort  variation  in  exposure  to 
Catalan  language  at  school,  results  show  that  individuals  who  have  experienced 
greater  exposure  to  teaching  in  Catalan  are  more  likely  to  say  that  they  feel  more 
Catalan  than  Spanish.  Interestingly,  the  effect  appears  to  be  present  also  among 
individuals whose parents do not have Catalan origins. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to analyze how policies affect individual identity. 
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§ EUI 1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity has been shown to be correlated with economic growth and
low-quality governments. Easterly and Levine (1997) claimed that high levels
of ethnic fragmentation were at the root of the Africa’s growth tragedy. The
literature that followed conﬁrmed these results. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) showed that ethnic heterogeneity is negatively
correlated with the quality of government and, more recently, Montalvo and
Reynal (2005) explored the channels through which ethnic diversity inﬂuences
economic development. They found that ethnic fractionalization lowers the
rate of investment, while ethnic polarization increases the probability of civil
wars.
Several social scientists (Anderson 1983, Bates 1983, Horowitz 1985),
however, have argued that the boundaries of ethnic groups are not exogenous
and change over time. They are likely to be aﬀected by social and economic
conditions and to be dependent on a number of economic and policy choices.
Thus, ethnic diversity can be inﬂuenced by precise political strategies
aimed at promoting national or ethnic identities among the population. In
fact, in ethnically diverse countries, politicians and political scientists have
focused on very diﬀerent policies as mechanisms of minority integration and
conﬂict reduction. Nation building policies (for example the implementa-
tion of a unique national language across the entire territory of a State) as
well as multicultural policies that explicitly recognize cultural diﬀerences (re-
gional autonomy, the devolution of powers or the use of multiple languages in
schools and in other contexts) have been often proposed as sources of conﬂict
management.
Limited research, however, has examined the extent to which identity
can be shifted by cultural policies and regulation. As the UN report for
2004 pointed out, language regulation inﬂuences the social environment that
encourages identity formation. Since identity is typically formed in the early
ages of life, language in schools turns out to be particularly important.
Our paper takes a step in this direction by analyzing the eﬀect of a par-
ticular educational policy on the process of identity formation. In 1983,
the Catalan education system became bilingual, and Catalan, together with
2Spanish, was taught in schools. Using survey data from Catalonia and ex-
ploiting within and between cohort variation in the exposure to the Catalan
language at school, results show that individuals who experienced greater
exposure to teaching in Catalan are more likely to say that they feel more
Catalan than Spanish. Interestingly, the eﬀect appears to be present also
among individuals educated in Catalonia after the reform but whose parents
do have not Catalan origins.
This reform can be interpreted as an example of a multicultural policy
within Spain, where individuals living in Catalonia are the relevant minority
and, at the same time, as an example of a nation building policy within
Catalonia, where individuals living in Catalonia who were born elsewhere or
whose parents do not have Catalan origins are the relevant minority. As a
result, nation building policies and multicultural policies deliver very diﬀerent
outcomes in terms of their eﬀect on individual sentiments: multicultural
policies tend to favour the development of regional identities while nation
building policies tend to promote the expansion of a common national feeling.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to analyze how policies
aﬀect individual identity.
Our empirical argument relies on within and between cohort variation
in exposure to Catalan language at school. The 1983 educational reform
aﬀected younger cohorts more than the older generations. Within a given
cohort, exposure to Catalan varies according to the number of years they
remain in education (some students leave school earlier than others).
A number of factors leads us to believe that the link between the linguis-
tic reform and individual identity is causal. First, some robustness checks
allow us to rule out the existence of education speciﬁc cohort trends for Cata-
lan feelings. Second we can exclude the idea that the reform changed the
composition of the Catalan population, as comparisons between migration
patterns in Catalonia and other Spanish regions show that Catalonia does
not present anomalous patterns. Moreover, since individual years of school-
ing are typically an individual and parental choice, we may be concerned
that they are aﬀected by the reform. Both another identiﬁcation strategy
that relies on the number of years during which students were taught in
Catalan within compulsory education and comparisons with the pattern of
3educational achievements in other Spanish regions suggests that this is not
the case.
This paper is related to the literature previously mentioned on the re-
lationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic outcomes and to a
growing economic literature on the identity formation process. In an inﬂu-
ential series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) and Akerlof
(2007) have incorporated identity, a person’s sense of self, into an economic
model of behavior. They propose a utility function that depends on the indi-
vidual’s assigned or chosen social category, on the match between (exogenous)
"prescriptions" for that category and individual’s given characteristics and
behavior, and on his and others’ actions. They have then presented several
applications of their theory in the ﬁelds of the Economics of Education, the
Economics of Organizations and Macroeconomics. Several theoretical studies
have followed the work by Akerlof and Kranton, including that by Benabou
and Tirole (2007), who endogenized identity payoﬀs and categorical prescrip-
tion. However, the number of empirical studies analyzing the determinants
of individual identity remain limited.
This paper is also connected to the literature on endogenous preferences.
This literature (see Bowles 1998 for a reviewof the topic) studies howpolitical
and economic institutions shape preferences through their eﬀects on social
norms, cultural transmission or through other channels. If identity is part of
the utility function, our paper isolates a particular institutional arrangement
(bilingual education) that is able to inﬂuence individual preferences.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief descrip-
tion of the reform and more generally of the institutional setting in Catalonia
after 1983. Then it discusses the data and the empirical strategy employed.
Section 3 presents the basic empirical evidence and provides several robust-
ness checks. Section 4 shows the results under a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strat-
egy, while Section 5 discusses the role of individual origin. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
42 Background and empirical strategy
2.1 Background
The Catalan language developed by the 9th century from vulgar Latin on
both sides of the eastern part of Pyrenees Mountains. Its territorial expansion
went hand in hand with the expansion of the Catalano-Aragonese Crown,
which was established in the "País Valencià", the Balearic Islands, the south
of France and the town of Alghero (in Sardinia, Italy) during many centuries.
These are the regions were Catalan is present nowadays with more than
9 million speakers, making it the most important regional language of the
European Union. Catalonia is the region that hosts most of them, with
more than 6 million speakers. However, in order to achieve it, the Catalan
Government has had to protect the Catalan Language, and sometimes even
promote its usage, because it was banned during Franco’s dictatorship (1940-
1975).
The democratization process that took place in Spain during the late
seventies led to the approval of a Constitution that, within a decentralized
government structure, recognized the existence of a set of autonomous com-
munities and allowed them to have their own regional parliaments. One of
the most important laws approved by the new Catalan Government was the
"General Directory of Linguistic Policy (1983)" which allowed the educa-
tional system, which prior to that date was all in Spanish as an inheritance
from the Franco’s period, to become bilingual. The law states that:
Art. 2: "The Certiﬁcate of Basic Educational Attainment will not be
achieved without proving proﬁciency of the oﬃcial languages of Catalonia
(Catalan and Spanish)".
Art. 6: "The Catalan Language, as it is the own language of Catalonia,
it is also the language used in the education system".
Art. 7.3: "The Language used in the education system will never separate
the alumni due to linguistic diﬀerences".
Since the Catalan Education system had been all in Spanish for such a
long time period, the transition to a bilingual system was smooth. As stated
in the "Order of Application of the General Directory of Linguistic Policy
5(1983)", for the ﬁrst 4 years of primary education the presence of Catalan
had to be smoothly increased, and it could not impede the normal learning
process of students already enrolled. For the subsequent 4 years of primary
education the presence of the Catalan Language in the education system was
initially introduced in social and natural science courses, and was increased
in the following years. For secondary education, the Order makes clear again
that the increased presence of Catalan Language at each school had to be
done in accordance with the students’ prior knowledge of Catalan, in order
to minimize its eﬀect on the normal learning process.
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis uses representative survey data on the institutional
attachment of residents in Catalonia to the Spanish State that was published
by "Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas" in 2001. This survey is performed
relatively often, but the one done in 2001 is of special interest as individuals
were asked not only about their national feelings, but they were also asked
about their origin and their parents’ origin.
To identify the individuals’ national attachment to Spain or Catalonia,
we rely on the following question: "With which of the following sentences
do you feel more identiﬁed? (i) I feel only Spanish, (ii) I feel more Spanish
than Catalan, (iii) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (iv) I feel more Catalan than
Spanish, (v) I feel only Catalan". That is, the closer is this number to 5, the
more Catalan and less Spanish you feel, and vice versa.
In Spain, primary education lasts 8 years and starts at the age of 6, while
secondary education lasts 4 years. Therefore, the cohorts that may have been
treated are those born between 1966 and 1983, while the control cohorts are
those born between 1948 and 1965. The treated cohorts are those exposed,
or potentially exposed to more years of teaching in Catalan, while the control
cohorts are those that have not been exposed to it. Thus, an individual from
the 1966 cohort that completed secondary education will have received one
year of treatment, while an individual from the same cohort, but with only
primary education, will have no treatment at all. Similarly, an individual
from the 1970 cohort that completed secondary education will have received
65 years of treatment, while an individual from the same cohort but with only
primary education will have received only 1 year of treatment.
Figure (1) describes the relationship between cohorts, years of schooling
and years of treatment. There are 4 major educational categories: (i) individ-
uals that did not complete primary education, which we assume that received
4 years of schooling; (ii) individuals that completed only primary education,
which received 8 years of education; (iii) individuals that started but did not
complete secondary education or that received some professional training, for
whom we assume that received 10 years of education; and (iv) individuals
that completed secondary education or a higher level of professional training,
who went through 12 years of education1.
Figure (2) plots the average time that each cohort has been exposed to
Catalan at school. The average presence of Catalan at school is obtained
from the questionnaire, where individuals are asked to classify between 1
and 5 how much their education was in Catalan and how much of it was
in Spanish, 1 being only Spanish and 5 only Catalan. This graph makes
clear that there has been a huge increase over time in the use of Catalan at
school. However, the increase started slightly after the 1960s’, and hence,
earlier than 1966, the year that we deﬁne as the ﬁrst cohort to be potentially
treated. This may show (as the anecdotal evidence we collected conﬁrms)
that some schools started teaching some subjects in Catalan earlier at their
own discretion.
What makes the change in the linguistic policy of Catalan schools a unique
case study is the following: although Spanish immigrants saw that language
of instruction was changed to a foreign one, they reached levels of education
in Catalan very similar to those received by natives. More precisely, in terms
of average years of education (see Table 1). The main reasons behind this are
that primary and secondary education were publicly provided and schooling
was mandatory until the age of 14 for most cohorts.
Ouridentiﬁcationstrategy relies on variationinCatalan instruction across
cohorts and years of education. A ﬁrst and simple analysis of the data
shows interesting patterns in the variation of the Catalan sentiments be-
1We do not consider university education since the law we study did not aﬀect it. Thus,
individuals with university education are included in the 12 years of education group.
7tween treated and control cohorts, and within each cohort (high vs. low
educated). If there is a link between language policy and peoples’ iden-
tity, the reform will boost the Catalan sentiment for those cohorts that were
educated in Catalan, which will be younger (born after 1966) and more ed-
ucated. Figures (3) to (15) show that this is indeed the case. Figures (3)
and (4) plot, respectively, the evolution of national sentiments of high (with
secondary education) and low (without secondary education) educated Cata-
lans by cohort. The vertical lines divide control and treated cohorts. As seen
in Figure (3), among control cohorts, younger and more educated cohorts
are more likely to feel "as Catalan as Spanish" and less likely to feel "only
Catalan": Catalan sentiments decrease with year of birth. The reform, how-
ever, seems to have reversed this trend in Catalan sentiments. A similar
process took place among respondents without secondary education. Figure
(4) shows that among control cohorts, the younger ones tend to feel "only
Spanish". The linguistic policy seems to have altered this tendency, which
is in part absorbed by the increase in the fraction of low educated Catalans
feeling more Spanish than Catalan. Moreover, it is also possible to notice
that prior to the reform, younger cohorts are more likely to feel "as Catalan
as Spanish" and less likely to feel "more Catalan than Spanish". After the
reform these trends change their sign, preventing the widening of the gap
between the two.
The linguistic law is also expected to be accompanied by an increase
in the within cohort variation, augmenting more the Catalan sentiments of
those individuals that received higher levels of treatment, that is, those more
educated. To check whether this is the case, Figure (5) plots the diﬀerence
between the fractions of high and low educated people for each type of answer
against year of birth. It is interesting to describe the pattern of the eﬀect
of the education reform on the category only Catalan. While prior to the
reform the diﬀerence was pretty stable around zero, there is a clear change
with the reform that leads the diﬀerence to increase signiﬁcantly as the gap
between the treatment intensity widens. This is partly reduced when the
low educated begin to be aﬀected by the reform and the fraction of them
feeling only Catalan increases. Figures (6) to (10) and (11) to (15) show the
between and within variation, respectively, in more detail.
8Tables (3) provides the full set of descriptive statistics of the main vari-
ables used, by education and by the samples used in the main regressions.
2.3 Empirical strategy
Teaching in Catalan started at the beginning of the academic year 1983-1984.
Cohorts who started their primary education on or after that academic year
where completely aﬀected, while cohorts who started primary education prior
to this but were still in primary or secondary education after 1983-1984 were
only partially aﬀected by the reform. The students’ exposure to the Catalan
language varies according to the number of years they have been in education
after the reform.
Thus, exposure to the reform varies according to year of birth and the
number of years of education for each individual. The eﬀect of the Catalan
law is identiﬁed using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach that exploits be-
tween cohort variation in Catalan instruction and within cohort variation in
years of education. The identiﬁcation strategy used in this paper is similar
to that used in Angrist and Lavy (1997) and Angrist et al (2006).
The ﬁrst econometric speciﬁcation to be tested is:
yijm = α + βLijm + γj + δm + Xijmµ + εijm (1)
Where the dependent variable yijm indicates whether individual i, from
cohort j and with m years of schooling answers: (1) I feel only Spanish, (2)
I feel more Catalan than Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel
more Catalan than Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan.
Lijm is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan. γj are cohort
dummies , δm is a dummy for the educational background and Xijm is a vec-
tor of individual-level control variables, including gender, individual’s origin,
parent’s origin and province dummies2.
The identiﬁcation strategy relies on the fact that there is no other variable
that aﬀects how some cohort-years of education group feels about the Catalan
2We exclude from the sample all the migrants who received some of their education
outside Catalonia.
9identity issue3. We run this speciﬁcation, ﬁrst as a linear regression and then
as an ordered logit, due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable4.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the cohort- years of education level,
to control for the fact that observations in a given cohort- years of education
group may be correlated.
3 Results
3.1 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates
Table 3 reports estimates for equation (1). In columns 1 and 2 we show
estimates in which we only control for years of education and year of birth
ﬁxed eﬀects, for the OLS and the ordered logit speciﬁcations, respectively.
OLS estimates show a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, suggesting that an
increase in exposure to the reform increases the probability that an individual
feels more Catalan. The ordered logit results go in the same direction and
are signiﬁcant. In columns 3 and 4 we add province dummies and controls
for gender, family and individual origin. Coeﬃcients are now slightly larger
than before. Even if the coeﬃcients for an OLS regression in which the
dependent variable is a discrete variable with values from 1 to 5 are diﬃcult
to interpret, the results suggest that those who received Catalan-intensive
instruction tend to have signiﬁcantly more intense Catalan feelings. The
intensity of Catalan sentiments is, as predictable, correlated with individual
origin and with the origin of the parents of the interviewed. We classiﬁed
respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals that were not born in Catalonia
2) individuals that were born in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3)
individuals that were born in Catalonia but with only one of parents born
in Catalonia 4) individuals that were born in Catalonia whose parents were
both born in Catalonia. We ﬁnd that Catalan identity is strongest among
respondents with Catalan origins and with parents with Catalan origins and
it is weakest among respondents that were not born in Catalonia.
3In another section of the paper we discuss the fact that years of education may not
be exogenous to the reform.
4Results for ordered probit are very similar and avalaible on request
10In order to interpret the ordered logit coeﬃcients, in Figure 16, we plot
how the probability of each answer changes with the intensity of the reform,
i.e., the number of years of Catalan instruction. This corresponds to the
ordered logit regression in column 4. This ﬁgure helps understanding the
size of the eﬀect of the exposure to Catalan instruction. On the one hand,
while the probability that an individual with 0 years of treatment says "I am
only Catalan" is less than 0.1, the probability that a respondent with full
treatment says "I am only Catalan" is almost 0.5. On the other hand, the
probability that an individual says " I am as Spanish as Catalan" appears to
be strongly decreasing with years of treatment (from more than 0.5 with 0
treatment to just more than 0.1 with 12 years of treatment). The probabil-
ity of choosing "Only Spanish" and "more Spanish than Catalan" decrease
slightly and the probability of choosing "More Catalan than Spanish" shows
a small increase with the length of exposure to the reform. Thus, results
suggest that, as a consequence of the reform, individuals are less likely to
answer that they feel "As Spanish as Catalan" and more likely to say that
they feel "Only Catalan".
3.2 Channel
The reform is expected to increase the amount of Catalan taught at schools
and to increase as well the likelihood that aﬀected individuals use Catalan as
a normal language of expression. This change in the language of instruction
can reinforce Catalan identity, both because Catalan becomes a the language
used when learning and because Catalan becomes the language used by in-
dividuals.
In order to check the validity of our hypothesis, we take advantage of
several questions asked during the survey. As it has been already mentioned
in the data section, in the survey individuals were asked to classify how much
of their education was in Catalan and how much in Spanish. We then create
an index from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to education only in Spanish and
1 to education only in Catalan. In order to have a measure of the length of
exposure of each respondent to Catalan teaching, we build a variable "Lan-
guage exposure" that is the product between the index previously described
11and years of education.
In the survey, there are also several questions that provide information
about the use of the Catalan language in the everyday life: 1) when the
interviewed meets with friends, 2) when he/she is at home, 3) when he/she
goes shopping, 4) if he/she is asked for directions in the street, 5) when
he/she answers the phone, 6) when he/she interacts with civil servants 7) or
when he/she is with his/her colleagues at work. We then create an index of
the "social use" of Catalan, that goes from 0 to 7, where 7 indicates that
the interviewed uses the Catalan language in all of these circumstances. As
a ﬁrst step, in the ﬁrst and second columns of Table 4 we check whether
the two indices are related to identity. As expected, there is a positive and
strong relationship between the two: the greater the use of the Catalan
language at school, the more intense the Catalan feelings and, at the same
time, the greater the use of Catalan in the everyday life, the more intense
are the Catalan feelings. As a second step, in columns 7 and 8, we run
a 2SLS in which we regress two indices on our measure of the intensity of
the reform and then regress our measure of identity on the predicted value
obtained in the ﬁrst stage. The coeﬃcients are both positive and signiﬁcant
at the standard level, meaning that language was truly an important channel
through which the reform aﬀected individual feelings. First stage coeﬃcients
show the positive impact that the reform had on the number of years of
education taught in Catalan and the extent to which Catalan is used in
everyday life.
The fact that the 2SLS results are larger than the OLS ones indicates that,
if there is an omitted variable that aﬀects individual identity and the self-
reported measure of Catalan at school, this will be negatively correlated with
identity and positively correlated with the self-reported measure of Catalan
at school (or vice versa). A possible explanation for this is that people who
say they feel more Catalan may be more likely to perceive the amount of
education they received in Catalan as being less or insuﬃcient, while people
who feel more Spanish might tend to perceive the amount of education they
received in Catalan as excessive. There is no question in the survey that
allows us to test this, but, since our self-reported measure of schooling in
Catalan is based on recall, this remains a possibility.
123.3 Eﬀect for each level of treatment
The marginal eﬀect of the treatment can be very diﬀerent for each level of
treatment. In fact, the number of years of treatment can vary from 1 to 12.
Those aﬀected by one year will have been aﬀected by the reform at the end
of their primary or secondary education. Those aﬀected by 8 years will be
aﬀected, either during primary education, if they only completed primary,
or during secondary education and the second half of primary education,
provided they completed secondary education. The eﬀect of the reform may
be diﬀerent for a student who was only aﬀected by one year than for a student
who was aﬀected for 12 years. In this section we wish to investigate how the
eﬀect increases with years of treatment. As a result, and similarly to Angrist
et al. (2006), we decided to introduce a dummy for each possible level of
treatment and run the following speciﬁcation:
yijm = α +
12 ￿
k=1
βkI(Ljm = k) + γj + δm + Xijmµ + εijm (2)
Where I() is the indicator function. This speciﬁcation is run both as an
OLS and as an ordered logit model.
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 10 report ordinary least square estimates of
equation (2). In column 1, only dummies for years of education and cohort
are included. In column 3, individual controls and province dummies are
added to the regressions. The results in both columns go in the same direc-
tion. Identity is aﬀected by the reform, although treatment eﬀects do not
increase monotonically with years of treatment, even if the eﬀect seems to
be stronger after 5 years of treatment. Ordered logit estimates for the same
two speciﬁcations are provided in columns 2 and 4.
Figure 19 conﬁrms the patterns proposed in the previous section. In this
ﬁgure we plot how a 0 to 1 change in each treatment dummy aﬀects the
probability of each answer. This corresponds to the ordered logit regression
in column 4. The probability of answering "I am only Catalan" increases with
the years of treatment, while probability of answering " I am as Spanish as
Catalan" appears to be strongly decreasing with the years of treatment. The
eﬀect of the reform on the probability of choosing the other 3 categories (only
13Spanish/ more Spanish than Catalan/ more Catalan than Spanish) does not
seem to be very relevant, as the lines ﬂuctuate around zero.
3.4 Heterogenous eﬀects
The introduction of a Catalan based schooling system (even if mitigated by
the rule that at least two subjects per year must be taught in Spanish) can
be interpreted as an example of a nation building policy within the Catalan
region. It is interesting then to check whether the reform has had an impact
on the feelings of minorities living in Catalonia. We deﬁne as a minority
group all of the respondents of non Catalan origin or with parents without
Catalan origin (we also distinguish between individuals from families with at
least one parent born in Catalonia and individuals from families with neither
of the parents born in Catalonia). We construct 4 dummy variables for these
categories and interact them with Lijm
5.
Columns 1-2 of Table 11 show that the reform had a positive and uniform
impact on the whole population; the eﬀect is positive not only on respondents
of Catalan origin and whose parents were both born in Catalonia, but also
on individuals born in Catalonia and from families with no parents born
in Catalonia or with only one parent with Catalan origin. Moreover the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term between the variable that captures the
length of exposure to teaching in Catalan and a dummy variable equal to one
if the respondent was born outside Catalonia is only marginally insigniﬁcant
in column 2. Overall, the results suggest that the new schooling system
successfully increased the level of integration of minorities within Catalonia.
4 Robustness checks
4.0.1 Exogenous trends
The estimates in Table 3, which point to higher Catalan feelings among those
who have been exposed to more intensive Catalan instruction, may be con-
5We also use other speciﬁcations: without cohort dummies, and with the instrumenta-
tion previously explained. All provide similar results. This is available from the authors
upon request.
14founded by education-speciﬁc cohort trends in Catalan feelings. Such trends
could have arisen through several channels: more educated people could feel
more Catalan, and that younger people could be more educated than older
people. Diﬀerent cohorts have been raised by parents with diﬀerent values
and preferences (the younger parents being more pro-Catalan), and those
parents with stronger Catalan preferences could have invested more in their
children’s education.
In order to check whether this is the case, and similarly to Angrist (2006),
we propose the following two exercises. As a ﬁrst step, we consider only
cohorts who have not been aﬀected by the reform. These are cohorts born
between 1930 and 1965. Then, among those cohorts, we assigned a pseudo-
treatment to the younger cohorts (the ones born between 1948 and 1965,
which were used as controls in the main speciﬁcation). This pseudo-treatment
consists of the intensity of the reform received by individuals with the same
number of years of education but born 18 years later. We run the speciﬁcation
proposed by equation (1). We use both an ordinary least squares speciﬁcation
and an ordered logit one. The results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table
5. The sign of the coeﬃcient of the pseudo treatment variable is very small
and not signiﬁcant. This is reassuring, as it may indicate that our results are
not spuriously capturing the eﬀect of a trend.
As a second check, we consider cohorts born between 1921 and 1980 and
we use the following speciﬁcation. To correct the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-type
estimates for the education-cohort trends, we use a triple diﬀerences-type
strategy. Triple diﬀerences estimates are based on the following equation,
yijm = α + βLijm + θlijm + γj + δm + Xijmµ + εijm (3)
where Lijm is a term that captures real exposure to teaching in Catalan,
while lijm captures spurious eﬀects.
Lijm are the years of real treatment for cohorts 1966-1980; while lijm
equals years of pseudo treatment for cohorts 1936-1950 (where now the
pseudo-treatment consists of the intensity of the reform received by indi-
viduals with the same number of years of education but born 30 years later)
and years of real treatment for cohorts 1966-1980. β are the triple diﬀer-
15ences estimates, i.e. the treatment eﬀects from the real experiment minus
the pseudo treatment eﬀects estimated using cohorts 1921-1950. Columns 3
and 4 report the results for this speciﬁcation. Triple diﬀerence estimates are
positive and signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient that would be capturing spu-
rious trends is negative and not signiﬁcant. We can conclude that, among
cohorts aﬀected by the reform, there are no education-speciﬁc cohort trends6.
As last step, we use individuals who arrived to Catalonia after they had
ﬁnished education. Pseudo-treatment for these individuals are the years of
education they received after 1983; since they received education outside
Catalonia, they can not be aﬀected by the reform. Results are shown in
column 5 of Table 5. As they are very few observations, only OLS results are
reported; however, the eﬀect of the reform is very small and not signiﬁcant
for these individuals. This further conﬁrms that the eﬀect is not due to other
policies that aﬀected younger and more educated people in a diﬀerent way.
4.0.2 Taking the within variation seriously
The identiﬁcation strategy previously described relies both on between co-
horts variation (older cohorts have not been aﬀected by the reform, while
the younger ones have been) and on within cohorts variation (individuals of
the same age that have diﬀerent levels of education and so may have been
exposed to diﬀerent levels of treatment). However, the number of years of
schooling is typically an individual choice (or a parental one) and may be
aﬀected by the introduction of the linguistic reform. One may imagine that
individuals with very intense Spanish (and anti-Catalan) feelings, for exam-
ple a migrant from another region of Spain, may have decided to drop out
from school because they may feel less comfortable about receiving education
in Catalan.
As an initial check to conﬁrm whether or not this is the case, we add
as a control into the regression a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
individual spoke Catalan at home with his or her parents. An individual who
normally speaks Catalan would have experienced fewer diﬃculties learning
Catalan at school and would less likely to drop out from education after the
6Because of lack of data about very old cohorts we could not use a larger number of
cohorts, such as, for example, from 1909 to 1983
16reform. The results of this speciﬁcation are shown in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 7 and are very similar to those obtained previously. This is reassuring,
as the language spoken at home could be the main source of endogeneity.
As a second step, in order to avoid considering any within cohort variation
we instrument Li,m with a measure of exposure to the reform that is not the
result of an individual choice: the number of years of compulsory education
for each individual. Each respondent belonging to the same cohort will be
subject to the same amount of exposure to compulsory education. This
should provide an exogenous measure of years of education. Results are
reported in Tables 6 and 7. As predictable, the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS
analysis (Table 6) shows a strong correlation between the variable of interest
and its instrument. Column 3 reports the second stage, the coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant and slightly smaller than the one we obtained before, even if they
are not very diﬀerent in magnitude. Finally, in columns 4 and 5 we report
the results when we use the reduced form (this allows us to use an ordered
logit model too). As before, results are consistent with our previous ﬁndings.
Then, as an additional test, we do as in Angrist et al (2006) and we control
for the cumulative distribution function for education using data from the
Spanish Census 2001. That is, for each individual, we compute the fraction
of people with an equal, or lower, level of education in her cohort. We also
control for the square of this variable. This accounts for the possibility that
the selection of students who reach higher levels of education changes over
time, especially if the reform causes it. Our coeﬃcients, shown in columns 6
and 7 increase slightly, which is reassuring.
Finally, instead of using years of education as intra-cohort variation in
years of treatment, we use variation in the date of arrival as a determinant
of more or less exposure to the language reform7. In order to perform this
exercise we restrict the sample to individuals who were not born in Catalonia.
These individuals arrived at diﬀerent points in time and at diﬀerent stages
during their education. For each individual we compute the number of years,
within compulsory education, for which they have studied in Catalonia after
1983. This is now our intensity variable, which we use to run:
7We include in the sample also migrants who received some education outside Catalonia
and who were not included in any of the previous speciﬁcations.
17yijm = α + βLijm + γj + δm + Xijmµ + εijm (4)
Where the dependent variable yijm indicates whether individual i, from
cohort j who arrived in Catalonia when he was m years old answers: (1) I
feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish
as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan.
Lijm is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan. γj are the cohort
dummies, δm are age at arrival dummies and Xijm is a vector of individual-
level control variables, including gender, origin and years of education dum-
mies.
This speciﬁcation is particularly useful since it allows us to use both
compulsory years of education, and cohort dummies. In this way we are able
to control for any issue related with the endogeneity of the education decision
and, at the same time, to rule out any potential problem of omitted variables
correlated with both identity and age.
The results are shown in column 8 of Table 7 and are very similar to those
obtained when the within-cohort variation used was given by diﬀerences in
the number of years of education. Now we do not have enough observations
to run an ordered logit, but the fact that the OLS results are very similar to
those obtained previously is reassuring. This shows that our results are not
driven by changes in years of education due to the reform.
Results in this section suggest that years of education are unlikely to
have changed endogenously as a consequence of the reform. This is as well
supported by the fact that schools provided facilities and extra time for
students for whom Catalan was not their mother tongue. As a ﬁnal check,
we plot average years of education by cohort for Catalonia, the Madrid region
(a region that has been at a similar level of development than Catalonia) and
the rest of Spain. This is done using data from the Spanish Census in 2001.
The graph (Figure 17) shows that years of education for cohorts aﬀected by
the reform (those born after 1966) evolved quite similarly in Catalonia and
in Madrid and did not decline for the Catalan cohorts aﬀected by the reform.
Years of education increased more for the other communities in Spain, as a
result of a process of convergence.
184.0.3 Restricting the sample
In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we were comparing individuals born in 1948 with
those born in 1983. While this allows us to use the maximum data available,
it may also introduce some noise. In order to mitigate this eﬀect, we perform
the same regression but compare individuals aged 26 (cohort 1975) with
individuals aged 45 (cohort 1956). As the cohorts we are comparing are
more similar, the results should be more reliable in this sense. Table 8 shows
that, when we restrict the sample and compare cohorts that have similar ages,
results sensibly improve. This may be because we are comparing cohorts that
are more similar among them and that have been aﬀected by similar shocks.
This allows us to increase the precision of our estimates and to capture better
the eﬀects of the reform.
4.0.4 Migration patterns
The reform might have changed migration patterns into and out of Catalonia.
If this is the case, our results could be capturing a change in the composition
of the Catalan society rather than the eﬀect of the reform. Schooling in
Catalan could have implied an additional cost of migration to Catalonia for
Spanish speakers. Potential migrants with very intense Spanish sentiments
could decide not to migrate towards Catalonia and, vice-versa, while the
additional migration cost could have been lower for open minded migrants.
In addition, people with very intense Spanish sentiments could decide to
leave Catalonia after the reform. If this is the case, our results could be
the product of a diﬀerent composition of the Catalan residents and not a
consequence of the reform.
Since we do not know the year in which the parents of the interviewed
migrated, we cannot exclude from the sample individuals who are potentially
aﬀected by this problem (with parents that migrated as a consequence of the
new law). Then we decide to check if our results hold only for individuals
born in Catalonia. Since the youngest cohort was born in 1983, we are then
restricting the sample to individuals whose parents were already in Catalonia
when the reform was implemented, so parents’ decision to migrate towards
Catalonia is less likely to be aﬀected by the linguistic reform. Columns 1 and
192 of Table 9 shows that the results are robust to this check.
However, it may still be the case that parents somehow anticipated the
1983 reform and then took the migration decision before 1983. To avoid this
anticipation problem we restrict even further the sample and we consider
only cohorts born in Catalonia between 1951 and 1978. Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 9 shows that results are robust to this robustness check.
Table 9 should be suﬃcient to convince that the results we ﬁnd are not
related to a change in the pattern of migration inﬂows in Catalonia. How-
ever, it can still be the case that patterns of migration outﬂows are aﬀected
by the reform and, at the same time, lie at the root of our results. Unfortu-
nately the survey we have does not allow for any checks that could help us in
this direction. Using data from INE, in Figure 18 we compare the patterns
of migration of Catalonia in the last 40 years with the patterns of migra-
tion of another Spanish region that is comparable in terms of income, i.e.
Madrid. We plot net migration inﬂows as a fraction of migration outﬂows
for Catalonia, Madrid and the other comunitites. It turns out there is no
substantial diﬀerence, either before or after the reform, in fact Madrid seems
to be loosing more citizens after 1990.
5 Summary and conclusions
Much has been said about the possibility that policies aﬀect individual iden-
tity, sentiments and preferences. However, to date, little case study research
has been conducted on this matter. This paper presents evidence of a positive
eﬀect of the educational reform, by which the education system became bilin-
gual and Catalan, together with Spanish, was taught at schools, on Catalan
feelings. The positive eﬀect extends also to individuals whose parents have
no Catalan origins.
The Catalan case allows us also to compare multicultural policies and
nation building policies. We interpret the reform as an example of multicul-
tural policies within Spain and of nation building policies within Catalonia.
We conclude that while multicultural policies stimulate regional identities,
nation building policies encourage the growth of a shared national sentiment.
Research of this sort together with the study of the eﬀects of such reforms
20on the political and economic outcomes can be highly relevant in ethnically
divided societies where policies (linguistic and not) can be seen as mecha-
nisms of integration and conﬂict reduction.
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23Figure 1: Treatment by Cohort and Years of Education
Figure 2: Catalan at School


























































1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981
4 yers od Edu. 8 Years of Edu. (Primary)
10 Years of Edu. 12 Years of Edu. (Sec.)Total Sample (1948-1983) Control Cohorts (1948-1965)Treated Cohorts (1966-1983)
Total Average 10,22 9,81 10,53
St. Dev. 1,90 1,94 1,82
Observations 1490,00 626,00 864,00
Catalan Origin Average 10,30 9,92 10,56
St. Dev. 1,87 1,89 1,81
Observations 1354,00 547,00 807,00
Cat. Origin with mixed Families Average 10,34 9,90 10,55
St. Dev. 1,81 1,86 1,76
Observations 246,00 79,00 167,00
Cat. Origin and No Cat. Family Average 10,04 9,62 10,23
St. Dev. 1,93 1,89 1,92
Observations 343,00 104,00 239,00
No Catalan Origin Average 9,50 9,09 10,07
St. Dev. 2,10 2,16 1,88
Observations 136,00 79,00 57,00
Table (1)
Average years of Education All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
 All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
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Figure 6: Fraction of respondents that feel  only  Catalan  by cohort and 
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Figure 7: Fraction of respondents that feel more Catalan than Spanish by 
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Figure 8: Fraction of respondents that feel as Catalan as Spanish by cohort 
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Figure 9: Fraction of respondents that feel  more Spanish than Catalan by cohort 
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Figure 10: Fraction of respondents that feel  only Spanish by cohort 
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Catalans with Secondary Education
Catalans without Secondary EducationAll series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
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Figure 12: The effect of education on feeling more Catalan than Spanish  
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Figure 14: The effect of education on feeling more Spanish than Catalan 
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1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 19781948-83 1948-65 1966-83 1948-83 1948-65 1966-83 1948-83 1948-65 1966-83
Identity Average 3,51 3,56 3,47 3.7 3.73 3.69 3.29 3.42 3.16
St. Dev. 1,04 1,03 1,05 0.91 0.9 0.92 1.12 1.1 1.13
Observations 1467 618 849 732 250 482 735 368 367
Years of Education Average 10,33 9,92 10,61 12 12 12 8.45 8.29 8.61
St. Dev. 1,88 1,97 1,77 0 0 0 0.97 0.96 0.95
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 741 371 370
Cat. Origin, Cat. Family Average 0,43 0,48 0,40 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.42 0.32
St. Dev. 0,49 0,50 0,49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.46
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Cat. Origin, mixed Family Average 0,17 0,14 0,19 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.18
St. Dev. 0,37 0,35 0,39 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.39
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Cat. Origin, no Cat. Family Average 0,28 0,20 0,33 0.24 0.15 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.39
St. Dev. 0,44 0,40 0,47 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.49
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
No Catalan Origin Average 0,11 0,16 0,07 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.08
St. Dev. 0,31 0,37 0,26 0.28 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.39 0.28
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Catalan at school Average 2,15 1,23 2,78 2.44 1.34 3.01 1.82 1.15 2.46
St. Dev. 1,35 0,71 1,33 1.39 0.85 1.27 1.23 0.57 1.35
Observations 1487 625 862 747 255 492 740 370 370
Cat. at school* years edu (Language exposure) Average 3,13 0,63 4,86 4.33 1.03 6.04 1.79 0.32 3.17
St. Dev. 3,78 1,98 3,77 4.18 2.55 3.81 2.72 1.28 2.98
Observations 1487 625 862 747 255 492 740 370 370
Catalan Social use Average 4,12 4,45 3,91 4.81 5.13 4.66 3.3 3,87 2.81
St. Dev. 2,70 2,68 2,72 2.34 2.22 2.39 2.86 2,82 2.8
Observations 1340 534 806 702 230 472 638 304 334
Language at home Average 0,44 0,49 0,40 0.5 0.56 0.47 0.37 0.44 0.29
St. Dev. 0,49 0,50 0,49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.45
Observations 1480 622 858 743 252 491 737 370 367
Intensity of treatment Average 4,02 0,00 6,78 5.37 0 8.12 2.49 0 4.83
St. Dev. 4,63 0,00 4,18 4.99 0 3.91 3.63 0 3.78
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Intensity of (compulsory) treatment Average 2,68 0,00 4,52 3.02 0 4.57 2.29 0 4.45
St. Dev. 3,51 0,00 3,53 3.53 0 3.43 3.45 0 3.67
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Female Average 0,49 0,49 0,49 0.49 0.43 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.45
St. Dev. 0,50 0,50 0,50 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.49 0.49
Observations 1490 626 864 749 255 494 741 371 370
Table 2
Cohorts (total sample) Cohorts (with sec. edu) Cohorts (without sec. edu)Table 3: Reform and Identity
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
intensity .067** .147*** .082*** .183***
(.029) (.055) (.026) (.058)
non catalan origin  -1.335*** -3.038***
(.1) (.247)
mixed family -.493*** -1.074***
(.073) (.16)
non catalan family -.958*** -2.187***
(.072) (.163)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO YES YES
No. obs. 1467 1467 1467 1467
Rsq .088 .324
Pseudo-Rsq .032 .149
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust
standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-
years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for
individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan
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Only Spanish More Spanish
As Spanish as Catalan More Catalan
Only Catalan
Probability of Different AnswersTable 4: Channels
Dependent variable: Identity
Language exposure Use of Catalan
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit First stage First Stage 2SLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Language exposure 0.032*** 0.075*** .113***
(.01) (.024) (.262)
use of Catalan .193*** .515*** .508***
(.013) (.04) (.161)
Intensity   .695*** .179**
 (.08)   (.08)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1464 1464 1321 1321 1464 1321 1464 1321
Rsq 0.329 0.457 0.524  0.519 0.287
Pseudo Rsq 0.152 0.232 0.138
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at
the cohort-years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in
Catalonia but with non-catalan parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Table 5: Controlling for exogenous trends
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
intensity .115*** .232**
(.037) (.93)
pseudo-intensity -.015 -.07 -.022 -.024  .023
(.032) (.075) (.036) (.094)   (.196)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES
1930-1965 1930-1965 1921-1980 1921-1980 1948-1983
No. obs. 1008 1008 1860 1860 155
Rsq .291 .295 .350
Pseudo Rsq .131 .135
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are
reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. Individual controls
include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but
with non-catalan parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Table 6: First stage





non catalan origin   .084
 (.116)
catalan origin mixed family   -.108
 (.089)
catalan origin non catalan family  -.122
 (.086)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES
PROVINCES YES
AGE and AGE SQUARED YES
No. obs. 1467
Rsq .951
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%,
*** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors
are reported between parenthesis and are
clustered at the cohort level. Individual controls
include a dummy variable for gender, for
individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals
born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents
and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed
parents. Table 7: Controlling for endogenity of years of education
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit 2SLS OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
intensity  .066**   .158***   .054**  .099***   .249***
  (.026)   (.059)  (.023)  (.034)   (.074)
intensity compulsory .056**   .105**
-0,025  (.049)
language at home   .688***  1.669***
 (.096)  (.235)
intensity (people arriving)  .069**
 (.038)
AGE AT ARRIVAL NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
CONTROLING FOR CDF NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES OLS YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
AGE and AGE SQUARED NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO
No. obs. 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 361
Rsq .361  .299  .296 .325 .523
Pseudo Rsq .171 .135 .149
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between
parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level for columns 1 and 2, at the cohort level for columns 3-9
and at the cohort-year of arrival level incolumns 10-12. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals








1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
yearborn
Rest of Spain Madrid
CatalunyaTable 8: Other robustness check: Restricting the sample
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
intensity 0.108*** 0.249*** 0.115*** 0.289***
(.027) (.064) (.031) (.072)
SAMPLE 1951-1980 1951-1980 1956-1975 1956-1975
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1245 1245 853 853
Rsq 0.318 0.354
Pseudo Rsq 0.149 0.166
Table 9: Other robustness checks: Migration.
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
intensity .069**  0.164*** .07** 0.18***
(.027) (.063) (.033) (.079)
SAMPLE 1948-1983 1948-1983 1953-1978 1953-1978
catorigin catorigin catorigin catorigin
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1333 1333 994 994
Rsq 0.288 0.287
Pseudo Rsq 0.135 0.138
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard
errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education
level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for individuals not born in
Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents and individuals born in
Catalonia with mixed parents. 
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust
standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-
years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for
individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan











































Catalonia in/out Madrid in/out
Other in/outTable 10: Effect for each level of treatment
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1 YEAR OF TREATMENT -.185 -.343 -.117 -.445
(.158) (.326) (.127) (.313)
2 YEARS OF TREATMENT .039 .118 .318* .751*
(.185) (.354) (.178) (.422)
3 YEARS OF TREATMENT .665*** 1.29*** .548***  1.147***
(.162) (.329) (.124) (.303)
4 YEARS OF TREATMENT -0.91 .062  .285  .721*
(.21) (.373) (.177) (.398)
5 YEARS OF TREATMENT 1.033*** 1.981*** .785*** 1.6***
(.211) (.434) (.163) (.407)
6 YEARS OF TREATMENT .383 .904** .594*** 1.479***
(.245) (.443) (.227) (.508)
7 YEARS OF TREATMENT .992*** 2.013*** .934*** 1.967***
(.226) (.447) (.194) (.471)
8 YEARS OF TREATMENT .562** 1.264** .837***  1.977***
(.28) (.505) (.264) (.588)
9 YEARS OF TREATMENT .764***   1.561*** .577**   1.185**
(.274) (.538) (.233) (.557)
10 YEARS OF TREATMENT .464  1.189** .823***  2.011***
(.329) (.6) (.303) (.679)
11 YEARS OF TREATMENT .77**  1.57**  .772***  1.575**
(.317) (.624) (.262) (.63)
12 YEARS OF TREATMENT .695**  1.585** 1.096***   2.485***
(.35) (.637) (.321) (.719)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS NO NO YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO YES YES
No. obs. 1467 1467 1467 1467
Rsq .1 .33
Pseudo Rsq .036 .152
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust
standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-
years of education level. Individual controls include a dummy variable for gender, for
individuals not born in Catalonia, individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan
parents and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. Figure 19








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Intensity of the reform
Only Spanish More Spanish As Spanish as Catalan








intensity*mixed family 0.081*** 0.172***
(.029) (.065)
intensity*non cat.family 0.075*** 0.163**
(.028) (.063)
non catalan origin  -1.272***  -2.835***
-0,114   (.272)
mixed family   -.472***   -.976***
 (.086)  (.184)
non catalan family  -.913***  -2.047***
 (.095)  (.210)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES
No. obs. 1467 1467
Rsq .325
Pseudo Rsq .15
* Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, ***
significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years
of education level. Individual controls include a dummy
variable for gender, for individuals not born in Catalonia,
individuals born in Catalonia but with non-catalan parents
and individuals born in Catalonia with mixed parents. 